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Non-technical Summary 
 
In times of increasing technological competition the access to technological 
knowledge is one of the major objectives for mergers and acquisitions (M&As). 
Technologically motivated firm acquisitions are, however, found to often fail in the 
sense that post-merger innovation performance as measured at the firm level 
declines. By focusing on the inventor level this study provides additional insights 
into the channels through which M&As influence technology performance at the firm 
level. M&As constitute a disruption to the working environment of the inventive 
labor force of the acquired company. If inventors would respond with a decline of 
their patent productivity or departure from the merged firm this can be detrimental 
to the innovative process within the merged entity and can be contradictory to the 
aims of the firm acquisition.  
This paper provides empirical evidence on post-merger mobility and productivity of 
673 inventors employed by European acquisition targets in the years 2000 and 2001. 
The empirical results show that 1.) the most productive and experienced individuals 
stay with the merged entity; 2.) inventors that left the acquired firm are less 
productive in post-merger years than those that stayed with the merged entity; 3.) 
M&As trigger inventor mobility, but do not lead to a decline in patent productivity 
if compared to a control group of inventors that have not been involved in a firm 
acquisition. The finding that the productivity of inventors is not affected contradicts 
a widespread hypothesis. The paper concludes with a summary of its contribution 
and management implications that can be derived from the analysis. 
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Abstract 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) constitute a disruption to the working 
environment of the inventive labor force of the acquired company. If inventors would 
respond with a decline of their patent productivity or departure from the firm this 
can be detrimental to the innovative process within the merged entity and can be 
contradictory to the aims of the firm acquisition. This paper provides empirical 
evidence on post-merger mobility and productivity of 673 inventors employed by 
European acquisition targets in the years 2000 and 2001. The empirical results show 
that 1.) the most productive and experienced individuals stay with the merged 
entity; 2.) inventors that left the acquired firm are less productive in post-merger 
years than those that stayed with the merged entity; 3.) M&As trigger inventor 
mobility, but do not lead to a decline in patent productivity if compared to a control 
group of inventors that have not been involved in a firm acquisition. 
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1 Introduction 
In times of increasing technological competition the access to technological 
knowledge is one of the major objectives for mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
(Chakrabati et al., 1994, Capron et al., 1998). Accelerated by the increasing 
importance of timing in innovation the acquisition of external knowledge as a 
complement to in-house development of technologies is often essential for firms in 
order to enhance or defend their position in a competitive market environment. 
Along with technology alliances (Teece, 1992, Hagedoorn, 1993) and licensing 
agreements (Teece, 1986), acquisitions of innovative firms are a fast and efficient 
way to access important technologies. Technologically motivated firm acquisitions 
are, however, found to often fail in the sense that post-merger innovation 
performance as measured on the firm level declines (e.g. Ravenscraft and Scherer, 
1987, Hitt et al., 1991, 1996). A post-merger reduction in research and development 
(R&D) activities can be explained by decreased incentives to innovate through 
enhanced market power after the merger (Arrow, 1962, Reinganum, 1983), on the 
one hand; but also by refinancing efforts of the M&A that can imply cuts in 
investments in other projects as for example in R&D projects (Hitt et al., 1996). In 
the post-acquisition period, the management is likely to focus more on the 
acquisition and the integration of the acquired firm so that decision making on 
routine technological matters can be delayed and efforts being supplied to day-to-day 
operations even in the technological core of the company can be minimal (Pritchett, 
1985, Hitt et al., 1996). If technology performance suffers in response to the merger, 
post-merger integration of the R&D activities of both firms might be inefficient 
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suffering from insufficient ex-ante planning and the inability to cope with differences 
in corporate culture (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999, Paruchuri et al., 2006). In 
consequence, the working climate can worsen and the productivity of individual 
inventors can decline. At worst, inventors leave the merged firm.  
The departure of inventors after a firm acquisition or a decline in their productivity 
harms the technology creation process within the merged entity and is often 
contradictory to the aims of the acquisition. Firm acquisitions often aim at accessing 
technological developments of acquisition targets in order to complement or 
strengthen their technological portfolio through M&As (Ahuja and Katila, 2001, 
Cassiman et al., 2005, Cloodt et al., 2006). M&As can also target on certain 
intellectual property rights of rivals (Lerner et al., 2003) that are important to 
continue ongoing research activities (O’Donoghue et al., 1998). Also, firm 
acquisitions can be used to set up barriers for competitors in technology markets and 
to reduce patent barriers firms face through the acquisition of patents with blocking 
potential (Grimpe and Hussinger, 2008). Furthermore, the technological know-how of 
the target firm’s inventive labor force can be an essential factor for the acquisition 
decision (Ernst and Vitt, 2000, Paruchuri et al., 2006).  
Indeed, outstanding people employed by the acquired firm can be an important 
criterion for firm acquisitions. For example, the acquisition of Groove by Microsoft 
in 2005 was motivated by closing a gap in Microsoft’s product line, on the one hand, 
as Groove offered products that were complementary to Microsoft’s products and 
were not provided by Microsoft itself.2 On the other hand, with the acquisition of 
                                                 
2 Groove offered products that were complementary to Windows Sharepoint Services (WSS) and 
Microsoft’s Portal Server (SPS), namely tools that made possible off-line access to WSS and SPS. 
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Groove Microsoft got Ray Ozzie, the founder of Groove, developer of Lotus Notes, 
and one of the most admired and respected individuals in the software industry, and 
his highly regarded team of software architects and developers. Microsoft believed 
that the compatibility of the existing and the newly acquired team of software 
specialists would lay a foundation for promising future innovations.3 In the case of 
Microsoft/Groove, the preconditions for post-merger integration were optimal from 
the acquired developer team’s point of perspective because Ray Ozzie became the 
new Chief Software Architect, the successor of Bill Gates. Hence, the acquired 
inventor team had an important advocate among the most powerful persons in the 
firm. This is, however, not the typical situation. A closer look at the vita of Ray 
Ozzie shows that it often happened that he left a company after it had been 
acquired, often his own start-up, to jump onto new projects. For example, he left his 
successful foundation Iris Associates three years after it has been acquired by Lotus 
Development in 1994. One year later this company was acquired by IBM. 
Apparently, there were more attractive opportunities for him outside the merged 
company. The example shows how important individual inventors and inventor 
teams can be for acquisition decisions and that there is a significant threat that 
those experts leave the firm in response to a take-over. 
This paper provides empirical evidence on post-merger mobility and patent 
productivity of the inventive labor force of acquisition targets in the first five post-
merger years. It is investigated whether the most productive and most experienced 
inventors of the acquired firm can be kept in the merged entity or whether those are 
most likely to leave after an acquisition. Further, this study compares the post-
                                                 
3 See http://spaces.live.com/editorial/rayozzie/pub/pages/who.html, 
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/features/2005/mar05/03-10GrooveQA.mspx. 
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merger patent productivity of inventors that stayed and of those that left the 
merged entity. The departure of inventors can constitute a significant loss of 
knowledge for the merged entity and the situation can be worse if the flown-out 
knowledge would be exploited in a new firm. The hypotheses are tested for a sample 
of 673 inventors that were working for European firms that were subject to an 
acquisition in the years 2000 and 2001. A selection model is applied to account for 
systematic differences between inventors that stayed and those that left the merged 
firm during the first five post-merger years in order to control for a potential 
selection bias in the estimation for inventors’ post-merger patent performance. 
Finally, the productivity of inventors involved in M&As is compared to a control 
group of inventors that were not involved in firm acquisitions in the same period in 
order to investigate whether post-merger inventor behavior is actually the response 
to the firm acquisition rather than an effect of general mobility and patent 
productivity patterns in the market. This paper is the first to provide a comparison 
between inventors involved in M&As and a control group of inventors not involved 
in M&As.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section presents the 
conceptual framework; section three describes the construction of the sample and 
section four shows descriptive statistics for the sample; section five motivates the 
empirical model and shows the estimation results; the final sections conclude with a 
discussion of the results, implications for management and technology competition, 
and limitations and topics for future research. 
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2 Conceptual framework 
Although nobody would doubt that technologies are an important motive for M&As 
(Capron et al., 1998, Graebner, 2004, Grimpe and Hussinger, 2007, 2008) and that 
the technology performance of a firm is affected by firm acquisitions (Hitt et al., 
1991, Ahuja and Catila, 2001, Cassiman et al., 2005), the existing evidence on the 
relationship between M&As and technological performance is rather scarce and the 
empirical findings are often conflicting as Veugelers (2006) summarizes her survey of 
the state of the art.4 The ambiguity of previous findings indicates that the 
understanding of how M&As affect technological firm performance is still limited. 
Veugelers (2006) points out a number of weaknesses of previous studies ranging from 
methodological issues (see also Valentini, 2004) over small sample sizes to difficulties 
with the interpretations of the results. Further, she criticizes that previous studies do 
not take into account the “full set of fundamental conditions”, for which she develops 
a proposal. 
                                                 
4 Scholars that focus on the contribution of firm-specific innovative assets to the expected value of the 
acquisition find mixed results. To give some examples: For large firms in the US (Hall, 1990) and 
Europe (Frey and Hussinger, 2006) the impact of technological assets and patenting on the probability 
of being acquired is negative. In a previous paper, Hall (1988) finds that acquiring firms with own 
research and development (R&D) activities value the R&D of their targets higher than the market 
does. Ali-Yrkko et al. (2005) find that there is a positive correlation between patenting activities and 
the likelihood of being acquired for a sample of Finnish firms. The same conclusion is drawn by 
Valentini (2004) and Ornaghi (2005) for two particular high-tech sectors. A robust finding in the 
literature is that firms seek to complement their own technology portfolios and output market share 
through acquisitions of firms that are active in related industry and technology sectors (Ahuja and 
Katila, 2001, Cassiman et al., 2005, Hussinger, 2005). 
Further, empirical evidence for the actual post-merger R&D performance is mixed as well. Ravenscraft 
and Scherer (1987), Hall (1990) and Hitt et al. (1996) find a decline of the R&D intensity in response 
to the merger with focus on US M&As. For a small sample of European M&As, Capron (1999) 
concludes that 50% of the M&As lead to an increased R&D performance of the firms involved. Based 
on case study evidence Chakrabarti et al. (1994) find that M&As enhance innovative outputs. Ahuja 
and Katila (2001) find a positive impact on the acquirer’s R&D for technological acquisition and a 
negative impact for non-technological acquisition for a small sample of worldwide M&As in chemistry. 
For the US pharmaceutical sector, Ornaghi (2005) finds that there is no increase in R&D efficiency 
after the acquisition, especially for M&As among technologically related parties. Based on case study 
evidence Cassiman et al. (2005) draw exactly the opposite conclusion. 
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Building on her critique and being aware of the fact that post-merger integration 
within a merged firm is often a black box for the researcher I argue that the firm 
level of analysis, which is typically chosen by previous studies in order to investigate 
effects of the merger on technology performance, might not always lead to new and 
meaningful insights. The ambiguity of previous findings illustrates the diversity of 
M&As objectives, which is also reflected in different integration actions taken post-
merger. Therefore, I see two ways how to improve the understanding of the effects of 
a merger on technology performance. First, it would be helpful to gather in-depth 
information on M&A deals and restructuring of R&D after the merger (e.g. 
Cassiman et al., 2005). Such case-based investigations can shed light on the black 
box of post-merger integration. However, case studies are typically limited to small 
sample sizes. Second, and on a large scale, additional insights can be gained by 
shifting the focus to more narrowly defined units of analysis than the firm level, as 
for example business lines, firm departments and employees and the productivity of 
those units after an acquisition. Going in the latter direction, this paper targets the 
inventor level of analysis. The response of inventors to M&As contributes to the 
understanding of post-merger technology performance by providing insights from a 
very narrowly defined perspective.  
Assumptions on knowledge creation within the firm 
Firm level analyses make some important assumptions. First, they imply that all 
more narrow levels of analysis, as business lines, departments and employees, are 
homogeneous (Felin and Hesterly, 2007). The objectives of a merger are, however, 
typically correlated with the fact that some subunits within the firm are more or less 
important than others. For example, firms engage in M&As to strengthen their core 
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competences or they implement M&As notwithstanding structural remedies 
employed by competition authorities, like divestures of profitable business lines. 
Second, a firm-level approach implies the assumption that knowledge and 
technologies are created by the firm as a collective organization (Klein et al., 1994, 
Felin and Hesterly, 2007). This is a strong and debatable assumption. Arrow (1962) 
already pointed out that there is “no need to consider the firm as the fundamental 
unit of organization in invention” and that “there is plenty of reason to suppose that 
individual talents are more important”. In this spirit, a large literature evolved that 
emphasizes the role of individuals and specialized human capital for knowledge 
creation (e.g. Zucker et al., 2002, Song et al., 2003, Felin and Hesterly, 2007, Teece 
et al., 1997, Kogut and Zander, 1992).  
Focusing on the process of knowledge creation within the firm, Dosi (1982) and 
Nelson and Winter (1982) argue that knowledge in the firm is created through highly 
embedded, path-dependent processes, which are difficult to imitate. In order to 
support these path-dependent R&D processes the firm develops routines. The 
individual inventors are used to work with and within these defined contexts that 
encompass physical setting, formal and informal procedures, colleagues, 
communication flows, monitoring and control systems etc. (Szulanski, 1999). They 
develop their own routines within the knowledge creation process. From this point of 
view, firm acquisitions that involve some kind of integration of the acquiring and 
acquired firm constitute in any case a disruption for the established routines and the 
working environment of the target firm. Individual inventors are supposed to react 
to these changing routines with changes in their productivity or departure from the 
company (Ernst and Vitt, 2000, Paruchuri et al., 2006).  
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Inventor heterogeneity and inventor response to acquisitions 
Inventors’ response to disruption through firm acquisitions is found to be 
heterogeneous depending on inventor characteristics and the degree of post-merger 
restructuring (Ernst and Vitt, 2000, Paruchuri et al., 2006). While previous studies 
focus on the centrality of the inventor within the acquired firm and the relatedness 
of his/her knowledge to the firm’s knowledge stock, this paper focuses especially on 
inventor performance and experience as those are key determinants for inventor 
productivity as well as for his/her bargaining power in job negotiations with the 
merged entity as well as with outsider firms in the market. 
In general, the move of an inventor to another company can be regarded as the 
result of a better job offer by another firm and the inventor’s willingness to move. 
M&As can trigger inventor mobility as firm acquisitions provide the acquiring firm 
an opportunity for personnel restructuring and are also supposed to trigger mobility 
from the inventor’s perspective. The announcement of an acquisition causes 
uncertainties for the inventors involved in the acquired firm, which might lead to a 
worsening of the working climate (Souder and Chakrabarti, 1984, Ernst and Vitt, 
2000). During the integration phase after the M&A, the investment of managerial 
time and efforts in R&D might be minimal (Pritchett, 1985, Hitt et al., 1996), which 
can worsen the situation. Further, duplicated research efforts have to be avoided 
after the merger so that some R&D projects might be stopped (Veugelers, 2006). In 
a similar vein, acquired inventors might have a very similar profile as their 
colleagues employed by the acquiring firm. This can lead to rivalries among 
inventors, degradation for inventors in leading positions and a loss in centrality for 
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some inventors within the merged entities (Paruchuri et al., 2006). Hence, it is 
expected that:  
Hypothesis 1: M&As trigger inventor mobility as compared to inventors that 
are not affected by M&As. 
For an outsider firm, hiring a new employee is an investment under uncertainty as 
the employer is not sure about the individual’s capabilities (Spence, 1973). Certain 
characteristics, however, signal the employee’s abilities and capabilities to potential 
employers as for example experience and, in the case of inventors, his/her patent 
productivity. Inventors with a high experience and an above-average patent 
productivity are more likely to receive job offers from outside the firm than others. 
This leads to mobility only if the former employer, the merged entity, cannot or does 
not want to outbid the offer made by the new firm. The highest bid is made by the 
firm that expects the employee to have the highest marginal productivity in its 
working environment (Palomeras, 2004).  
From the inventors’ point of view, the decision is presumably more complex as the 
personal situation, as for example family status, might play an important role for the 
decision to accept or reject a job offer. Given that the utility functions of inventors 
are unobserved and assumingly heterogeneously, inventors are, on average, assumed 
to accept a job offer if it is better than her/his current labor contract. Hence, it is 
expected that more productive employees are more mobile than others (Hoisl, 
2007a,b, Palomeras, 2004). However, the larger the knowledge stock of an inventor 
the larger is the probability that she/he receives a good offer by the merged entity. 
Given that individuals can play a major role in firm acquisitions and given that an 
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outsider firm faces higher uncertainty with respect to the skills and capabilities of an 
inventor it is likely that we observe the star scientists staying with the merged firm, 
whereas inventors with an intermediate productivity can be more likely to move. 
The latter might not be of special interest for the merged entity and might get a 
better job offer by an outsider firm.  
Hypothesis 2: More productive employees are more likely to move; 
but only up to a certain threshold, beyond which the likelihood of 
moving decreases in patent productivity.  
A somewhat countervailing effect is expected from inventor experience. Although 
experience can be a positive signal to outsider firms, gathering experience goes often 
hand in hand with the accumulation of significant firm-specific knowledge and a 
firm-internal individual career that decreases people’s mobility. Therefore it is 
hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 3: The likelihood to move decreases in experience. 
The fact that the highest job offer is made by the firm that expects the employee to 
have the highest marginal productivity in its working environment (Palomeras, 
2004) provides an explanation for the finding that inventor productivity, on average, 
increases after a move (Hoisl, 2007a,b). However, there are at least two arguments 
illustrating that this must not necessarily be the case. First, labor contracts with the 
former employer can prohibit the exploitation of knowledge for a new employer, at 
least for a certain time period (Biger and Plaut, 2001). Second, the inventor has to 
get acquainted to the new working environment (Paruchuri et al., 2006). Both 
factors constitute a countervailing effect to the expected post-move productivity 
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increase for the immediate years after the move. In addition, in case of M&As not all 
inventors might leave the merged firm because of a better job offer. Some have to 
leave because of structural changes within the new firm or because their knowledge 
becomes obsolete after the integration of two R&D departments. The labor market 
literature argues that displacement leads to significant salary reductions, which can 
be interpreted as an indication for barriers to knowledge transferability into a new 
firm (Becker, 1962, Parson, 1972, Kriechel and Pfann, 2005). 
Hypothesis 4: Post-merger patent productivity is higher for inventors 
that stayed with the merged entity than for those that left.  
Finally, inventors involved in M&As - independent of whether they stay with the 
merged entity or whether they change employer - have to deal with a new or 
modified working environment, which is likely to affect their productivity.  
Hypothesis 5: The patent productivity of inventors involved in 
M&As is lower than the patent productivity of inventors not 
involved in M&As.  
Evidence on inventors’ response to firm acquisitions 
To my knowledge, there are only two empirical studies that focus on inventor 
mobility and productivity against the background of M&As. A pioneering paper on 
the behavior of key inventors after firm acquisitions is provided by Ernst and Vitt 
(2000). Their focus is on 19 acquisition targets in Germany that were subject to an 
acquisition in the years 1989 and 1990. 61 key inventors were involved in those 
acquisition targets, a third of which left the firm after acquisition. Based on a 
univariate statistical analysis Ernst and Vitt (2000) conclude that inventors’ post-
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merger patenting performance declines in terms of patent quantity and quality. 
Further, they find that fluctuation of inventors was observed especially in cases with 
large cultural differences between the R&D departments of merger parties and where 
the acquisition target was large. 
The second paper on the behavior of inventors after firm acquisition focuses on 62 
acquisition targets in the US pharmaceutical industry in the period 1979-1994 
(Paruchuri et al., 2006). The authors investigate under which conditions the 3,933 
inventors involved in these acquired companies leave in the post-merger period and, 
further, trace patent productivity of the subsample of 1,090 inventors that stayed 
with the merged company. Paruchuri et al. (2006) find that inventors react 
differently on acquisitions depending on their position in the acquired firm. They 
conclude that the disruptive effect of a merger is strongest for individuals that loose 
their status and centrality within the new firm and for those whose technology 
expertise does not match the technological core competence of the acquiring firm.  
This paper contributes to the literature by investigating the behavior of inventors 
after an acquisition for a sample of firms located in Europe across different industry 
sectors. The focus is not so much on organizational factors that determine inventor 
mobility and productivity as this has been shown by previous research, but rather on 
the question whether the most experienced and most productive inventors leave the 
company after an acquisition and if their patent productivity is affected. The 
hypotheses are tested in a multivariate framework controlling for selectivity of 
inventors that left the firm after the acquisition. The paper adds on previous 
empirical evidence not only by comparing the patent outcome of inventors that left 
the merged firm with the post-merger performance of the survivors within the firm, 
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but also by comparing inventor patent productivity to a control group of inventors 
that were not involved in M&As in the same period. This analysis shows whether 
the changes in inventor behavior are indeed reactions to the M&A or rather reflect 
general mobility and productivity dynamics. 
3 Data 
The analysis is based on a newly created data set that contains information on firms 
that have been subject to majority acquisitions in Europe and their inventive labor 
force. The data allows identifying mobility of the inventors involved in the 
acquisition targets based on their patenting activities (see also Ernst and Vitt, 2000, 
Palomeras, 2004, Trajtenberg et al., 2006, Paruchuri et al., 2006, Hoisl 2007a,b). 
Construction of the sample and identification of unique inventors 
The sample is based on the M&A database of Bureau van Dijk Electronic 
Publishing, in which all European firms that were subject to a majority acquisition 
in 2000 and 2001 were identified. This yielded a sample of 9,913 acquisition targets 
distributed over a range of different industries and European countries.  
The next step was to check whether those acquisition targets were active in 
patenting. In order to do so, the acquisition targets were linked to the patent data 
base of the European Patent Office (EPO). The match of firms and their patent 
records was supported by a computer supported text-based search algorithm that 
creates a “similarity score” for firms and patent applicants based on firm names and 
addresses. Each match proposed by the search engine with a similarity of at least 
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90% was manually checked.5 The matching procedure revealed that 919 of the 
acquisition targets applied for a patent at the EPO at least once since firm 
foundation.   
Next, the names and addresses of the inventors were identified from the patent 
application files. As the interest of this paper is to analyze inventor mobility around 
the time of the acquisition it was checked whether, how often, and when the 
inventors changed their affiliation over their entire patenting career. This was done 
based on the EPO patent data. A problem in tracing inventors in this way is the 
identification of unique inventors. Although the EPO database contains information 
as inventor names, addresses, patent applicants, and technology classes, there is no 
unique identifier for individual inventors. Hence, this identifier had to be created 
taking into account possible spelling differences and potentially missing parts of 
inventor names, as for example a second first name that does not appear on every 
patent application (Trajtenberg et al., 2006). In order to identify all patents of the 
inventors involved in the acquired companies, again, a text-based search algorithm 
was used to match the inventor sample with the complete list of inventors that 
applied for EPO patents since foundation of EPO in 1977. The matching criterion 
was only the name of the inventor in order to minimize the risk of losing correct 
matches due to changes in inventor addresses. This led to a huge number of 
proposed patents for each inventor. As there were many inventors with similar and a 
few with identical names, manual checks were done based on similarity of inventor 
addresses, applicant names, application dates and technology fields in order to 
identify whether the names in question indeed belong to the same person. Manual 
                                                 
5 If only a particular division of the firm was acquired only the division’s patents were taken into 
account. 
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checking was possible as the number of patents was relatively small as compared to 
inventor mobility studies that focus on all inventors at the United States Patent and 
Trade Mark Office (USPTO) (see Trajtenberg et al., 2006). Subject to the manual 
check were those matches with a similarity in names of at least 90% as determined 
by the search algorithm. Although information on patent applicants, application 
dates and technology classes of the patents was used to support the accuracy of the 
manual checks, in some cases, it was not always possible to identify unique inventors 
based on this information from the EPO patent database. That was the case for a 
few very common surnames like "Clarke", "Möller" or "Davis" that appeared with a 
common first name as for example "John". Those few cases, less than 5% of the 
patent records, were excluded from the patent and inventor list. The result of the 
manual check was a list of unified inventors, which applied for an EPO patent under 
the acquired company at least once in their career. From this list, further inventors 
were deleted if they were active for the firms of interest, but not during the time 
period of interest. Concretely, inventors that were active for the firm after 2003 only 
or before 1995 only were dropped. Last, inventors with only one patent application 
were deleted as the patent data base does not provide information on their mobility.  
The final sample consists of 673 uniquely identified inventors that applied for 
patents under the targets’ names in the relevant period. Those inventors correspond 
to 396 different firms. In other words, 43% of the target firms with a patent portfolio 
have at least one inventor with more than one patent application. On average, each 
target firm in the final sample employs 1.7 of those inventors. In total, the inventors 
applied for 6,471 patents during their whole patenting career. The average (median) 
inventor filed 10 (6) EPO patents over her/his entire patenting career until 2005 and 
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the target company appears as the applicant on 72% of all their patent applications. 
Every second inventor has patent applications with the target company only.  
Identifying Inventor Mobility 
Based on the sample of unique inventors their mobility was traced in the next step. 
In line with previous studies (Ernst and Vitt, 2000, Palomeras, 2004, Trajtenberg et 
al., 2006, Paruchuri et al., 2006, Hoisl 2007a,b), inventor mobility is defined as a 
change of the patent applicant on the inventor’s patents over time according to the 
EPO patent data.  
There are three major problems in tracing inventors in patent data: 
1. An inventor shows up on another firm’s patent application but did not move: An 
example is research alliances between firms. Under such agreements it can 
happen that an inventor working for firm A appears on a patent of alliance 
partner B. A further issue is past M&As, which often infer a change of the 
applicant on the inventor’s patents without corresponding to any move of the 
inventor. Further, an inventor can be employed by a university or an institution 
and be involved in a temporary research projects in collaboration with the 
business sector, which makes his name appearing on one or more companies’ 
patents. In order to identify all those cases that do not correspond to an inventor 
move the history of patent applicants on inventor patent records has to be taken 
carefully into account. The sample size of this study allowed conducting manual 
checks for each observation indicating a move based on information taken from 
the World Wide Web, mainly newspaper and firm homepages, to exclude cases 
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that do not exhibit inventor moves.6 Hence, the mobility definition in this paper 
can be considered as pretty accurate if compared to large-scale inventor mobility 
studies that have to rely on purely algorithm-based inventor tracing and are, 
hence, likely to overestimate the number of moves by inventors.  
2. An inventor moves and does not show up on patents anymore: This type of 
inventor mobility cannot be identified based on patent data. In order to 
overcome this shortcoming, the empirical section provides robustness checks for 
the sample of “known survivors” only, i.e. for those inventors that appear again 
on a patent after the firm acquisition. The major findings do not change. 
3. An inventor does not move and does not show up on a patent after the M&A: 
Again, in such cases, patent data do not allow detecting mobility. Some 
inventors, for example, left the lab after the acquisition for a position in the 
management of the merged entity. Although his study is focusing on tracing 
mobility of inventors, not on inventor research careers and how they are 
impacted by firm acquisitions, the fact that some inventors change their job after 
firm acquisition can cause some noise in the data, only part of which is picked up 
by the robustness check for the sub-sample of “known survivors”.  
In total, the majority of 449 inventors stayed with the new company after the 
acquisition. As in Ernst and Vitt (2000), who also did a careful checking of the 
mobility pattern, this corresponds to two thirds of the sample.7 129 inventors do not 
appear again on patent documents after the firm acquisition.  
                                                 
6 Still it cannot be claimed that all research alliances are accounted for as not every research alliance is 
disclosed. However, the mobility definition is as accurate as possible.  
7 To give a comparison, Paruchuri et al. (2006) who rely on algorithms only to identify inventor 
mobility find that two thirds of the inventors leave after the acquisition. 
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4 Definition of variables and descriptive statistics 
A look at the descriptive statistics shows that inventors that stay with the merged 
company and those that leave after firm acquisition differ systematically. Table 1 
compares the mean values of the variables of interest for the 224 inventors that left 
after the acquisition (or quit their inventor career) and for their 449 colleagues that 
stayed with the merged entity until 2005.8  
Inventor pre-merger patent productivity: Pre-merger patent productivity is defined 
as the number of patents inventors filed before the acquisition took place. A first 
thing to notice is that there is little difference between the pre-merger patent 
productivity of both groups of inventors. On average, inventors that stayed with the 
acquired company had about one patent more before the acquisition took place than 
inventors that left. If the skewness of inventors’ patent productivity is taken into 
account by comparing the logs of their pre-merger patent applications, the leaving 
inventors did better in the past and the difference in mean values is statistically 
significant from zero at the 1%-level.  
Inventor’s ties to the acquired company: Inventors that stayed with the acquired 
company had significantly more patents with the target company in the pre-merger 
period. On average, 81% of their total patents were applied for with the acquired 
firm, whereas only 66% of the patents of inventors that left the firm after the 
acquisition were filed with the acquisition target. Inventors that have more patents 
with the acquired firm are supposed to have closer links to their employer and that 
they might be on a promising firm-internal career track. 
                                                 
8 Table 5 in the Appendix shows the mean values of the variables for inventors that stayed with the 
merged firms, those that left to another firm and those that quit their patenting career.  
 21 
Inventor post-merger patent productivity: Focusing on post-merger patent 
productivity, defined as the number of patents per inventor in the period 2002-2006, 
Table 1 shows that inventors that left are significantly less productive than their 
colleagues. The difference holds if skewness in the patent productivity is taken into 
account using the log of post-merger patents per inventor.9 Note that the significant 
difference in post-merger patent productivity is not driven by the fact that the group 
of leaving inventors contains also those that stopped their patenting career after the 
acquisition: taking into account the “known survivors” only the patent productivity 
of inventors that left the acquired company is still significantly smaller than the 
performance of their colleagues with 2.89 patents, on average (see Table 5 in the 
Appendix). 
Inventor experience: Table 1, further, shows that inventors that stayed with the 
company after the take-over are, on average, significantly less experienced than 
others. Experience is measured as the number of years since the inventor’s first 
patent application at the EPO. 
Inventor excellence: To control for the value of the pre-acquisition patent output of 
an inventor a binary variable indicates whether the pre-acquisition patents of an 
inventor received citations by other patents within a 5-years window after 
application. This measure takes a positive value for only a few inventors. Less than 
20% of the inventors receive citations, which reflects the well documented skewness 
of the patent citation distribution (Harhoff et al., 1999, 2003).10  
                                                 
9 For inventors with zero post-merger patent applications the log is computed as log(post-merger 
patents +1).  
10 Harhoff et al. (1999) find for a sample of patent applications by German inventors in 1977 that 
69.5% of those patents receive no citation at all. As in another paper (Harhoff et al., 2003), the authors 
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Inventor independence: The percentage of private patents over total patents per 
inventor measures the ability or preference to work independently. Leaving inventors 
have a significantly higher share of private patents than their colleagues that stayed 
with the merged firm.  
Inventor technological diversification: A further control variable is a technological 
diversification index for the individual inventor’s pre-acquisition patent portfolio. 
This measure is calculated as follows based on the IPC (International Patent 
Classification) 3-digit technology classes j: 
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N refers to the number of pre-acquisition patents per inventor i and per inventor and 
technology class ij, respectively. The measure takes high values (close to one) for 
inventors with a diversified technology portfolio and the lowest value (zero) for 
inventors that patent exclusively in one particular technology class. Table 1 shows 
that inventors that left in the post-acquisition period are more diversified than their 
colleagues. The difference is statistically significant at the 1%-level. 
Inventor centrality with respect to the acquired firm: Another control variable is the 
centrality of the inventor for the acquired firm, as a measure that reflects how 
closely the inventor’s research is related to the target firm’s technology portfolio. In 
order to calculate this measure inventor i’s technology portfolio Fi is defined as the 
assemblage of his/her patent stocks for all 3-digit IPC technology classes. The 
technology portfolio of the acquired firm k is defined analogously. This yields two 
                                                                                                                                            
find that the patent value distribution as measured by citations and the estimated value of patents 
from the inventors’ point of perspective is very skew and follows a log-normal distribution. 
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technology vectors, one for the inventor i, Fi, and one for the acquired firm k, Fk. 
The patent stocks per technology field are formulated as percentages of the total 
patent stock of the inventor (and the firm, respectively) in order to control for size 
differences of patent portfolios of inventors and companies. Technological relatedness 
of patent portfolios of inventors i and firms k, Tik, is calculated as: 
10;
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Table 1 shows that the patent portfolio of inventors that stayed with the merged 
entity is significantly more related to the technologies of the acquisition targets than 
is the patent portfolio of those that left. 
Inventor centrality with respect to the acquiring firm: Analogously, the centrality for 
inventors i with respect to the acquiring companies’ l patent portfolios is calculated 
as Til. Table 1 shows that there is a small but also significant difference between 
both groups of inventors with respect to their average centrality to the acquiring 
firm: the patent portfolio of leaving inventors is less related to that of the acquiring 
firms than that of staying inventors. Paruchuri et al. (2006) have shown that 
centrality is a key determinant of post-merger inventor mobility and productivity. 
Time since inventors’ last patent application: Further, time since inventors’ last 
patent application before the take-over is taken into account. This variable is an 
attempt to control for the fact that an employee might have stopped her/his 
inventor career before the firm acquisition took place. Table 1 shows that the last 
patent application of the inventors that left is significantly longer ago than that of 
the individuals that stayed with the merged entity. 
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Control variables for the M&A deal: Besides those inventor characteristics, some 
information on the M&A itself is taken into account as the acquired stake, whether 
the deal was horizontal, i.e. whether the merging firms were affiliated with the same 
3-digit NACE sector, and whether the M&A was cross-border.  
Acquiring firm characteristics: With respect to firm characteristics, firm size of the 
acquiring firm is taken into account as the number of total patents applied for by 
the firm as information on total assets or total labor force is not available. As an 
R&D related firm size measure this variable is supposed to be an appropriate size 
definition from the inventor’s point of view. There is no significant difference in the 
average number of patents of acquiring firms for both groups of inventors, neither in 
absolute number nor in logs.  
Target firm characteristics: For the acquisition target, two dummy variables control 
for the total number of inventors in the acquired firm in the pre-acquisition period. 
More than 20% of the inventors worked for an acquisition target with more than 
four active inventors as could be identified from the firms’ total patent application 
stock. The share of inventors that were part of large inventor teams is lower among 
those that left the firms. More than 30% of the inventors were involved in firms with 
a smaller number of inventors. The majority of inventors was involved in firms with 
only one active inventor with more than one patent in the period of interest. For 
this reason, target firm size cannot be proxied by the total number of firms’ pre-
acquisition patents as there is a high correlation with the inventors’ pre-merger 
patents. Further, dummy variables show the most frequent target NACE classes and 
target home countries. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Inventors Involved in M&As  
 Inventors  
Behavior after the acquisition 
stay with acquired 
or merged entity 
leave or quit 
their patenting career 
t-tests on difference of the 
mean values 
Number (#) of observations  449 224  
 
mean 
(std. deviation) 
mean 
(std. deviation) 
difference 
(std. error) 
Inventor characteristics:    
# pre-acquisition patents  
6.88 
(11.22) 
5.93 
(5.27) 
-0.95 
(0.79) 
log(# pre-acquisition patents) 
1.23 
(1.10) 
1.50 
(0.74) 
0.26*** 
(0.08) 
pre-acquisition patents of the inventor for the 
acquired firm over total patents (%) 
0.81 
(0.30) 
0.66 
(0.34) 
-0.15*** 
(0.03) 
# post-acquisition patents 
4.16 
(5.38) 
1.23 
(2.71) 
-2.93*** 
(0.38) 
log(# post-acquisition patents) 
1.35 
(0.03) 
0.49 
(0.05) 
-0.86*** 
(0.06) 
citations received (yes/no) 
0.15 
(0.36) 
0.17 
(0.38) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
private patents (yes/no) 
0.07 
(0.26) 
0.17 
(0.37) 
0.10*** 
(0.02) 
experience  
8.79 
(6.69) 
9.92 
(6.21) 
1.13** 
(0.53) 
pre-acquisition techn. diversity 
0.32 
(0.31) 
0.41 
(0.30) 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
centrality (target) 
0.22 
(0.37) 
0.07 
(0.17) 
-0.15*** 
(0.03) 
centrality (acquirer) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.00* 
(0.00) 
time since last patenting 
0.65 
(1.21) 
1.36 
(1.06) 
0.71*** 
(0.10) 
M&A deal characteristics:    
acquired stake 
94.13 
(14.88) 
94.33 
(14.11) 
0.20 
(1.20) 
horizontal M&A (same 3-digit NACE) 
0.48 
(0.50) 
0.45 
(0.50) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
cross-border M&A 
0.44 
(0.50) 
0.58 
(0.50) 
0.13*** 
(0.04) 
Acquiring firms’ characteristics:    
# patents of acquiring firm 
118.47 
(1,146.17) 
87.96 
(291.32) 
-30.51 
(77.83) 
log(# patents of acquiring firm) 
1.77 
(2.05) 
1.78 
(2.05) 
0.01 
(0.17) 
Target firms’ characteristics:    
group of 2-4 inventors (yes/no) 
0.32 
(0.47) 
0.41 
(0.49) 
0.09** 
(0.04) 
group of more than 4 inventors (yes/no) 
0.27 
(0.45) 
0.20 
(0.40) 
-0.07** 
(0.04) 
target in NACE 24-26 
0.14 
(0.35) 
0.08 
(0.18) 
-0.06** 
(0.03) 
target in NACE 29 
0.15 
(0.36) 
0.16 
(0.37) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
target in NACE 30-33 
0.19 
(0.40) 
0.14 
(0.35) 
-0.05* 
(0.03) 
German target 
0.37 
(0.48) 
0.29 
(0.45) 
-0.08** 
(0.04) 
French target 
0.17 
(0.37) 
0.15 
(0.36) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
UK target 
0.18 
(0.38) 
0.24 
(0.43) 
0.06** 
(0.03) 
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5 Empirical model and results 
The empirical analysis of the paper has two parts. In the first section it is 
investigated whether the most productive and most experienced inventors stay in the 
merged entity after a firm acquisition (Hypotheses 2 and 3). Further, the post-
merger patent productivity of inventors that stayed in the merged firm is compared 
with the patenting performance of those inventors that left for a new employer 
(Hypothesis 4). In section 5.2 it is investigated whether the results hold if inventors 
involved in M&As are compared to a random sample of inventors that were not 
involved in M&As in the period of interest in order to show whether firm 
acquisitions, in fact, increase inventor mobility and impact their patent outcome 
(Hypotheses 1 and 5). 
Inventors’ response to M&As: mobility and patent productivity — empirical model 
In order to investigate whether the most productive and most experienced inventors 
leave a probit model is estimated for the inventor decision to stay with the merged 
entity:  
{ }0 21 >+++= iiiii uZexperiencetyproductivipatentIs ααα   (3) 
si depicts the inventor’s post-merger mobility and equals one if the inventor stays 
with the merged entity. Mobility depends on the inventor’s pre-merger patent 
productivity, experience and further control variables on the inventor, the M&A deal 
and both firms, Zi. ui is the error term of the model.  
In the second part of the estimation, post-merger patent productivity of inventors 
that left vis-à-vis those that stayed is investigated. In order to account for 
systematic differences between leaving and staying inventors identified in the probit 
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model (3) that might correlate with their post-merger productivity a selection model 
is applied following Heckman (1974, 1976, 1979). Selection models take into account 
potential selectivity based on observable factors, like inventor patent productivity, 
and unobservable factors, as for example a change in the firm’s technology strategy 
after the merger or a worsening of the working climate etc. In order to do so, a 
selection correction term λi is introduced into the estimation for post-merger patent 
productivity: 
iiiii sXtyproductivipatent εγλδβ +++=     (4) 
Xi depicts a vector of inventor, M&A deal and firm characteristics. The decision to 
stay in the company is depicted by si. The estimated coefficient for this binary 
variable indicates post-merger productivity differences between inventors that stayed 
and those that left. The error term of the model is denoted by εi. Following 
Heckman (1974, 1979) the selection correction term λi is parametrically specified as 
the inverse hazard rate. For inventors that stayed with the merged company λi 
equals φ(Zi’α)/Φ(Ζi’α); for those that left  λi equals  −φ(Zi’α)/(1−Φ(Ζi’α)). λi is 
calculated based on the estimates of the selection equation (3).11 
In theory, Heckman’s parametric selection model is identified by the nonlinear shape 
of the inverse hazard rate. In application, however, λi is often almost linear. In order 
to achieve identification in applications exclusion restrictions, i.e. variables that 
affect the selection equation (3) but not the outcome equation (4), have to be 
specified. The list of exclusion restrictions covers the share of pre-acquisition patents, 
centrality of the inventor for acquired firm, a dummy for cross-border acquisitions 
                                                 
11 Hussinger (2008) shows that selection model estimates are quite robust with respect to less restrictive 
specifications of the selection correction. 
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and industry sector dummies. Those variables have an impact on the likelihood to 
leave the merged entity, but non on inventors’ post-merger patent productivity. The 
share of pre-acquisition patents reflects the quality of the pre-acquisition inventor-
firm match. Inventors that are productive within their firm are likely to enjoy their 
working environment and are often doing well in firm-internal career paths. This is 
likely to decrease inventor mobility, but has not necessarily implications for 
inventors’ patent productivity. The centrality variable indicates that it is important 
that the inventor’s profile fits to the firms’ technology portfolio; otherwise the 
inventor is more likely to look for a better inventor-firm match (Paruchuri et al., 
2006). Further, inventors involved in cross-border M&As are supposed to be more 
likely to leave after the acquisition than others because the corporate culture in the 
acquired firm might differ significantly more than for domestic M&As. There is no 
statistically significant effect of those variables on inventors’ post-merger patent 
productivity.  
Inventors’ response to M&As: mobility and patent productivity — empirical results 
Table 2 shows the estimation results for equation (3) and (4) for the full sample and 
provides two robustness checks. The first two columns present the estimated 
coefficients for the full sample (model Ia), where the first column shows the results 
for the likelihood to stay with the merged entity and the second column shows the 
results for inventors’ post-merger patent outcome. The estimation results for the 
likelihood to stay with the merged entity reveal that pre-acquisition patent 
productivity as measured by the log of the total number of patents the inventor 
applied for before 2000 matters in a nonlinear way (Hypothesis 2 cannot be 
rejected). The most productive inventors, which are supposed to be of high value to 
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the new firm, but also for other firms in the market, are likely to stay with the 
acquired company. Medium productive inventors are most likely to leave after an 
acquisition and the least productive inventors have a high probability of staying with 
the merged entity again. A possible explanation for the latter finding is that the 
least productive people in terms of patent outcome might be technical assistants that 
do an important job by running the lab and that appear on a patent only here and 
there. Medium productive inventors seem to have the largest incentive to look for a 
job outside the firm. This can be explained by the fact that: first, they can be more 
easily replaced than star scientists and are presumably more expensive than 
technical staff; second, those inventors might see the acquisition as a chance to 
advance in their career and look for a new job in another environment. 
The results further show that experience decreases the probability of leaving the 
merged entity after a firm acquisition (Hypothesis 3 cannot be rejected). This shows 
that experience is often accompanied by a firm-internal individual career that 
decreases people’s mobility. The result is in line with previous empirical findings (see 
Palomeras, 2004). 
With respect to the further control variables the results suggest that inventors with 
private patents are less likely to stay after a merger than others showing that the 
ability or preference to work independently matters. Moreover, inventors that filed 
their last patent a long time before the acquisition are more likely to leave the firm 
after the take-over than colleagues that were active in patenting more recently. This 
variable is an attempt to control for having left the inventor position in the target 
firm already before the acquisition took place. Centrality of the inventor for the 
acquired firm with respect to the relatedness of their patent portfolios is important 
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for the likelihood to stay. The more the inventors’ technology portfolio is related to 
target firm’s technology portfolio the less likely is a move. Inventors that have a 
high share of their previous patents with the acquisition target are likely to stay 
with the merged entity. Those inventors might be central for the acquired firms and 
might have sound career opportunities within that firm. Further, inventors are more 
likely to leave after a cross-border acquisition and there are industry sector 
differences for mobility. In particular industry sectors, namely in chemistry (NACE 
24), rubber and plastic (NACE 25), non-metallic mineral products (NACE 26) and 
electrical and optical equipment (NACE 30-33), inventors are more mobile after a 
firm acquisition than in other sectors. There is no effect of centrality of the inventor 
for the acquiring firm as was found in Paruchuri et al. (2006). Lastly, there is no 
effect of technological diversity of the inventor’s patent portfolio, firm size of the 
acquired firm in terms of previous patent applications, and patent quality measured 
by a dummy variable that indicates whether the inventor’s patents received 
citations. 
The results for post-merger patent outcome of the inventors can be found in the 
second column of Table 2. The estimated effects indicate that inventors that stayed 
with their company are more productive than their colleagues that left the merged 
firm after the acquisition (Hypothesis 4 cannot be rejected). On average, they file 
more than one patent application more in the post-merger period. This productivity 
difference in the immediate post-merger years might be due to the fact that 
inventors have to get acquainted to a completely new research environment if they 
leave the merged firm, on the one hand. On the other hand, inventors are often not 
allowed to exploit the knowledge they gathered in the old firm for a new company, 
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at least for a certain time period. This is often explicitly contracted with the former 
employer.  
The selection correction term is statistically significant showing that the likelihood 
to leave after the acquisition is correlated with the inventor’s post-acquisition patent 
performance. The selection correction term captures unobservable effects that drive 
both the likelihood to stay in the acquired company and the post acquisition patent 
outcome. As we observe a negative coefficient of the selection correction term it 
might measure factors like loyalty to the acquisition target or the success of post-
merger integration. Unobservable inventor-firm characteristics like loyalty and a 
successful post-merger integration are likely to negatively affect both the likelihood 
to leave and the patent outcome in a new or changed environment. 
With respect to inventor characteristics, Table 2 shows that past patent productivity 
has a strong impact on post-merger patent productivity. This variable is an attempt 
to control for individual-specific fixed effects like inventors’ creativity and 
motivation. In a similar vein, inventors that worked independently of firms in the 
past, as measured by a dummy that indicates whether the inventor had private 
patents in the pre-merger period, are more productive in the post-merger period. The 
dummy for inventors’ cited patents is a further predictor for post-merger patent 
productivity. Besides the value of the inventor’s patent stock this variable captures 
whether there is a demand for the technologies the inventor is developing.  
Further, patent productivity decreases with experience. This is likely to reflect the 
productivity life cycle pattern of scientists. Typically scientists experience their 
productivity climax in their younger days and afterwards productivity declines over 
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the rest of the career (Levin and Stephan, 1991).12 The negative coefficient can also 
measure that inventors, which are active already for a long time, are potentially less 
able to cope with a new environment than their younger colleagues.  
Table 2: Estimation Results from a Selection Model 
 Ia Ib II 
endogenous variable stay  log(pat) A log(pat) A stay log(pat) A 
estimation method probit OLS OLS probit OLS 
sample full sample 
known 
survivors 
patents > 4 
 estimated coefficient 
 (standard error) B 
stay (yes/no)  1.19*** 0.39**  1.11*** 
  (0.15) (0.19)  (0.21) 
  -0.28*** -0.12  1.18** 
  (0.09) (0.11)  (0.23) 
log(# pre-acquisition patents) -1.33*** 0.24*** 0.29*** -1.90*** 0.13*** 
 (0.24 (0.03) (0.03) (0.56) (0.05) 
log(# pre-acquisition patents)2 0.40***   0.47***  
 (0.07)   (0.13)  
private patents (yes/no) -0.53*** 0.18** 0.08 -0.42*** 0.12 
 (0.19) (0.08) (0.09) (0.21) (0.11) 
log(experience) 0.21** -0.13*** -0.18*** 0.35** -0.22*** 
 (0.10) (0.03) (0.04) (0.15) (0.06) 
pre-acquisition techn. diversifity 0.10 0.06 -0.01 -0.19 -0.04 
 (0.24) (0.10) (0.10) (0.31) (0.15) 
citations received (yes/no) -0.03 0.17** 0.17** -0.16 0.17** 
 (0.16) (0.07) (0.07) (0.17) (0.08) 
group of 2-4 inventors  -0.16 -0.32*** -0.31*** -0.41** -0.49*** 
(yes/no) (0.13) (0.06) (0.06) (0.18) (0.08) 
group of more than 4 inventors -0.11 -0.31*** -0.23*** -0.48** -0.39*** 
(yes/no) (0.16) (0.07) (0.07) (0.22) (0.10) 
time since last patenting -0.27*** -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.28*** -0.17*** 
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) 
pre-acquisition patents of inventor for  0.65***   0.99***  
the acquired  firm over total patents (%) (0.21)   (0.25)  
centrality (target) 0.62**   2.60  
 (0.31)   (2.15)  
centrality (acquirer) -0.74   0.90  
 (1.89)   (2.61)  
    ... to be continued 
                                                 
12 Note that Levin and Stephan (1991) found that the productivity peak in terms of publications 
happens later in the scientists’ career. Hall et al. (2007) show that there can exist identification 
problems arising from vintage, age and time that make it difficult to predict the exact peak of 
scientists’ productivity peak. 
 33 
… continued    
 Ia Ib II 
endogenous variable stay log(pat) A log(pat) A stay log(pat) A 
estimation method probit OLS OLS probit OLS 
sample full sample 
known 
survivors 
patents > 4 
 estimated coefficient 
 (standard error) 
acquired stake 0.00   0.00  
 (0.00)   (0.01)  
log(patents of the acquiring firm) 0.00   0.00  
 (0.03)   (0.04)  
cross-border M&A -0.27** -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.10 
 (0.12) (0.05) (0.05) (0.16) (0.07) 
horizontal M&A 0.12 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.06 
 (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) (0.15) (0.07) 
target in nace 24 - 26 0.35**   0.39  
 (0.20)   (0.27)  
target in nace 29 0.05   0.07  
 (0.16)   (0.22)  
target in nace 30 - 33 0.47***   0.25  
 (0.16)   (0.20)  
constant 0.43 0.44*** 1.16*** 1.21 1.18*** 
 (0.52) (0.15) (0.18) (0.80) (0.22) 
number of observations 673 544 395 
Wald-2-stat 463.62*** 244.95*** 286.33*** 
***, **, * indicates statistical significance on the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 The endogenous variable log(pat) is defined as the logarithm of the sum of post-merger patents per inventors +1 in 
order to handle the observations for which the post-merger outcome is zero.  
 
Moreover, inventors that have been employed by acquisition targets with more than 
one active inventor are less productive after a take-over than individuals that were 
the only active inventor in the acquired company. There are no significant effects for 
the merger deal characteristics. 
Two robustness checks for the results are presented. First, the empirical findings for 
patent productivity might be upward biased due to the fact that some inventors quit 
their patenting career after the merger and, hence, have a zero post-merger patent 
outcome. Those individuals were so far labeled as leaving the company because they 
stopped inventing for the merged company. In some cases, however, those inventors 
stayed with the merged entity but left the lab and took a job in the management. As 
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it is, hence, not clear, how to treat those individuals a robustness check is done for 
the subsample of known survivors, i.e. those inventors that applied for at least one 
patent after the acquisition took place. The third column (model Ib) shows the 
results for the post-merger patent outcome for this subsample. It turns out that the 
estimated coefficients are quite robust. There is still a significant productivity 
premium for inventors that stayed with the merged company (Hypothesis 4). 
However, the productivity advantage is, as expected, smaller than for the full 
inventor sample. Whereas inventors that stayed had, on average, more than 100% 
patents more in the post-merger period than their colleagues for the full sample, this 
effect more than halves for the sample of inventors that continued to patent after 
the take-over.  
The second robustness check shows that the estimation results are robust if a more 
narrow definition of key inventors is applied. A subsample that covers only inventors 
with more than four patents in total is defined. Column four (model II) shows the 
probit estimates for the likelihood to leave after an acquisition for this subsample 
and the last column of Table 2 shows the estimates for the patent outcome equation. 
Again, the results are quite robust with respect to the underlying sample. The probit 
estimates, however, show that the effect of centrality of the inventor’s patent 
portfolio for the target firm’s patent portfolio disappears for the key inventors. This 
is due to the fact that there is less variation in the centrality variables for the most 
productive scientists. Further, key inventors that worked for firms that employed 
other inventors are more likely to leave the acquired firm than others. The estimates 
for the patent outcome show that the effect of staying with the merged company is 
the same as for the full-sample. If the inventor or the key inventor stayed with the 
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merged entity she/he applies for, on average, more than 100% more patents in the 
post-merger period than an inventor that left.  
Inventor post-merger mobility and productivity compared to a control group 
The previous results have shown that inventors react on M&As in terms of mobility 
and patent productivity. Now, it remains to be shown that inventors involved in 
M&As behave differently than inventors that have not been involved in firm 
acquisitions in the same year (Hypotheses 1 and 5). If there would be no significant 
difference in mobility and productivity patterns of M&A inventors and a control 
group the observed inventor behavior in post-merger years would reflect rather 
general mobility dynamics in the market than a response to the firm acquisition. A 
comparison of M&A inventors with a control group has not been provided by the 
previous studies on inventor behavior after firm acquisitions (Ernst and Vitt, 2000, 
and Paruchuri et al., 2006). 
This study uses a control group of 741 inventors that was randomly drawn from the 
list of all inventors that applied for an EPO patent in 2000/2001 with a company 
that was not involved in a M&A then.13 The sample of control inventors was treated 
as described in section 3 for the M&A inventor sample. Table 3 shows some 
descriptive statistics for the variables of interest for M&A inventors and controls. 8% 
of the inventors in the control group left the firm after the year 2000/2001. If 
compared to the inventors involved in firm acquisitions, where 33% left the firm in 
the same period, this suggests that inventor mobility is an actual response to the 
                                                 
13 It would have been optimal to draw the control group from as a sample of firms that were not 
involved in a merger in the same industry class in the same years and trace the inventors employed by 
those firms. This was, however, not possible as a complete list of European private and public firms 
from which the sample could have been drawn does not exist. Hence, I have to stick to a random 
sample of inventors rather than firms in the same year.   
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M&A. With respect to the further variables there is, on average, no big difference 
between inventors involved in M&As and the control group. Maybe most interesting, 
inventors in the control group have, on average, about one patent more before and 
after the acquisition period.  
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for M&A Inventors and Control Group 
 Inventors  
 Involved in M&A Control group 
Number (#) of observations  673 714 
 
mean 
(standard deviation) 
Mean 
(standard deviation) 
stay 
0.67 
(0.47) 
0.92 
(0.28) 
# pre-acquisition patents  
6.56 
(9.66) 
8.07 
(9.41) 
pre-acquisition patents of the inventor for the 
acquired firm over her total patents (%) 
0.76 
(0.32) 
0.87 
(0.24) 
# post-acquisition patents 
3.18 
(4.87) 
5.41 
(5.85) 
citations received (yes/no) 
0.16 
(0.37) 
0.24 
(0.43) 
private patents (yes/no) 
0.10 
(0.30) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
experience  
9.16 
(6.54) 
8.04 
(5.16) 
pre-acquisition techn. diversity 
0.35 
(0.31) 
0.31 
(0.29) 
centrality (employer in 1999) 
0.17 
(0.33) 
0.35 
(0.19) 
time since last patenting 
0.88 
(1.20) 
0.28 
(0.45) 
 
The estimation strategy is the same as before: first, the likelihood to leave the firm 
in the period after 2001 is estimated; and in a second step, an estimation for the 
patent productivity in the same period is estimated taking selectivity into account. 
A binary variable is introduced into the specification defined by equations (3) and 
(4) in order to distinguish between M&A inventors and the control group, which 
implies that a merger is assumed to be exogenous for the individual inventor:  
{ }0& 321 >++++= iiiiii uZAMexperiencetyproductivipatentIs αααα  (5) 
iiiiii AMsXtyproductivipatent εγλγδβ ++++= &    (6) 
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The estimation results are presented in Table 4. Again, a robustness check is 
provided for inventors with more than four patents. A robustness check for known 
survivors only cannot be presented as none of the known survivors in the control 
group left the firm after the time period of interest. This can be interpreted as a 
strong indication for the fact that firm acquisitions are a significant reason for 
inventor mobility.  
The estimated effects for the likelihood to leave the firm after 2001 (first and third 
column of Table 4) confirm that a firm acquisition significantly increases the 
likelihood that inventors as well as key inventors with more than four patents leave 
the firm (Hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected). The further estimated coefficients for the 
likelihood to stay in the company are in line with the results discussed in the 
previous section.  
With focus on the patent outcome after the year 2001 the second column of Table 4 
shows that inventors that stay with their firm beyond the year 2001 are more 
productive than those that change their employer. There is no significant difference 
for inventors that have experienced a firm acquisition and the control group (no 
empirical support for Hypothesis 5). Hence, the productivity decline after moving 
might be due to the fact that inventors have to get acquainted to a new research 
environment independent of having been involved in a merger, on the one hand. On 
the other hand, independent of having been involved in a merger inventors are often 
not allowed to exploit the knowledge they gathered in the old firm within a new 
company, at least for a certain time period.  
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Table 4: Estimation Results from a Selection Model with Control Group 
 I II 
endogenous variable stay (yes/no) log(pat)
 A stay (yes/no) log(pat) A 
estimation method probit OLS probit OLS 
sample full sample patents > 4 
 estimated coefficient 
 (standard error)A 
stay (yes/no)  0.97***  0.89*** 
  (0.15)  (0.20) 
  -0.20**  -0.20* 
  (0.09)  (0.11) 
M&A -0.71*** -0.07 -0.42*** -0.04 
 (0.12) (0.05) (0.16) (0.06) 
log(# pre-acquisition patents) -0.96*** 0.27*** -0.93*** 0.20*** 
 (0.20) (0.02) (0.38) (0.03) 
pre-acquisition patents of the inventor for 
the target over her total patents (%) 0.30***  0.25***  
 (0.06)  (0.09)  
private patents (yes/no) -0.34** 0.18*** -0.26 0.13* 
 (0.15) (0.06) (0.16) (0.08) 
log(experience) 0.15** -0.15*** 0.13 -0.21*** 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) 
pre-acquisition techn. diversity 0.15 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 
 (0.17) (0.06) (0.21) (0.08) 
citations received (yes/no) 0.02 0.09** -0.02 0.07 
 (0.12) (0.04) (0.13) (0.08) 
time since last patenting -0.28*** -0.20*** -0.29*** -0.25*** 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) 
patents for the acquired firm 0.91***  1.07***  
 (0.16)  (0.18)  
centrality (employer in 1999) 0.65***  1.09**  
 (0.24)  (0.45)  
constant 0.85*** 0.60*** 0.87* 1.08*** 
 (0.30) (0.15) (0.45) (0.19) 
number of observations 1,414 1,027 
Wald- 2 948.29*** 485.60*** 
***, **, * indicates statistical significance on the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
A The dependent variable log(pat) is defined as the logarithm of the sum of patents per inventors +1 after 2001 
in order to handle the observations for which the post-merger outcome is zero.  
 
To summarize, a merger increases the likelihood that inventors leave the merged 
firm, but there is no effect of M&As on their patent productivity if compared to an 
inventor control group. The latter finding contrasts previous literature (Ernst and 
Vitt, 2000, Paruchuri et al., 2006). However, in previous papers inventor mobility 
and productivity was not compared to a control group.  
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6 Discussion 
In summary, this paper reveals several interesting findings: 1) inventors react 
differently on firm acquisitions; the most productive and most experienced 
individuals are, however, most likely to stay with the merged entity; 2) post-merger 
patent performance of inventors that stayed with the merged entity is higher than 
the patent outcome of the inventors that left after the M&A; although 3) M&As 
trigger inventor mobility 4) patent productivity of inventors involved in M&As is 
not lower if compared to a control group of inventors that were not affected by firm 
acquisitions. 
Contribution 
This study has perceptive implications for research on the impact of M&As on 
technology performance. Previous empirical research, which typically focused on the 
firm level of analysis, has found ambiguous results for the implications of M&As for 
innovation activities of the firms involved (Veugelers, 2006). For this reason different 
perspectives can be helpful in order to get further insights into the channels through 
which M&As influence innovation within the merged entity. One way to get more 
insights would be in-depth case studies (Cassiman et al., 2005). However, case 
studies are typically limited to small samples of analysis. Another possibility is to 
shift the focus of analysis towards more narrowly defined levels of analysis than the 
firm level. Evidence from the level of the business unit, the firm department and the 
employee level can lead to new results that can be helpful for understanding the 
different findings of previous empirical studies.  
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Focusing on the inventor level, this study quantifies the loss of knowledge through 
inventor mobility and declines in their productivity after M&As. The empirical 
results show that inventors react differently on firm acquisitions depending on their 
pre-merger performance, their experience, and the intensity of their ties to the 
acquired company. Star inventors with a large patent portfolio and a rich experience 
can be an important factor for the decision to acquire a particular firm and their 
departure after an acquisition could conflict with the acquisition motivation. Such 
inventors have significant bargaining power within the merged entity, but also in 
negotiations with other companies in the market. The empirical findings show, 
however, that the most productive and most experienced inventors can be kept in 
the merged entity after firm acquisitions. Further, close ties to the acquired company 
work in favor for the merged entity hindering inventors to leave the company in the 
post-merger period.  
The analysis further reveals that inventors’ response to the firm acquisition as a 
disruption to their working environment and their established working routines is 
heterogeneous. While productive inventors have less difficulties to catch up with 
their pre-merger performance, inventors that are already for a long time in the 
patenting business and those that have been working in a research environment with 
other inventors before are less productive in the post-merger period than others, 
independent on whether they stayed with the merged entity or left for a new 
challenge. An important finding is that the patent productivity of inventors that left 
after the acquisition is significantly lower than the patent outcome of their colleagues 
that stay with the merged firm. This finding shows that the knowledge outflow 
through inventors leaving the company is limited. Reasons for that can be that 
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inventors need a certain period to get acquainted to a new working environment, on 
the one hand. On the other hand, labor contracts might inhibit the exploitation of 
the knowledge gathered in the old firm for a new employer, at least for a certain 
time period. 
A further important contribution of this study is that it compares the post-merger 
behavior of inventors involved in M&As with a control group of inventors that was 
not affected by M&As in the same time period. The empirical findings confirm that 
mobility is indeed a response to firm acquisitions and not a pattern of general 
industry dynamics. However, the results show that inventors involved in M&As are 
not less productive than others in the post-merger period as is hypothesized by the 
previous literature, but never explicitly tested. This leads to the conclusion that 
inventor mobility after M&As is rather explained by inventor heterogeneity and just 
triggered by the firm acquisition rather than caused. 
7 Management implications 
Two management implications can be derived: First, M&As trigger inventor 
mobility, but the most experienced and most productive inventors can be kept with 
the merged firm. This can be explained by the fact that the uncertainty about the 
skills and capabilities of the inventors is smaller for the acquired firm than for a 
potential new employer. Hence, acquiring firms should make sure to exploit this 
advantage. They can enhance their advantage in making more suitable job offers to 
inventors they want to keep than outsider firms by getting a detailed picture of the 
inventive labor force of the target company, their technological skills, and 
knowledge, and also of their working routines in the acquired firms. The same 
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knowledge about acquired inventors can be used to limit disruptive effects to their 
working routines, which should positively affect their productivity. Acquiring firms 
should keep in mind that the threat of leaving is largest for inventors with a medium 
patent productivity. An early screening of inventor profiles can help to keep 
individual inventors among those that are most likely to leave after an acquisition in 
case this is expected to be beneficial. 
Further, the fact that inventors that stay with the acquired company are, on 
average, more productive than their colleagues that left in response to a merger 
shows that although the departure of inventors constitutes a significant knowledge 
outflow the lost knowledge cannot be exploited in the new firm without any 
difficulties. On the one hand, the new employer of the inventor might lack the 
necessary capacities to fully use the acquired knowledge. On the other hand, it might 
be that labor contracts with the old employer hinder the inventor to make use of her 
knowledge in the new company, at least for a certain time period. Moreover, the 
inventor might need some time to get acquainted with the technologies and the 
working environment of the new firm. A look at the patent portfolio of the acquired 
inventors provides detailed information on their previous work. This information can 
be used when developing the design for post-merger integration. For example, it can 
help to find out with which technical equipment the inventors were working before, 
it can show whether the inventor worked alone or in a team of inventor (which can 
be seen from the presence of co-inventors on his patent filings), and, hence, can be 
used to define an appropriate position for the individual inventors within the new 
firm.  
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8 Limitations and future research 
An obvious limitation of this study is the limited availability of firm data. Most 
debatable is maybe the fact that firm size has to be proxied by the size of the firms’ 
patent portfolio, which doesn’t really allow to control for size differences because the 
firm size of the acquired firm is highly correlated with the patent portfolio of the 
(often few) inventors involved. As the data covers not only large and public firms it 
would be extremely difficult, if at all possible, to find firm information for small and 
private firms that have been acquired several years ago.  
A second limitation of the study, like of any, is its boundedness in scope. It would be 
interesting to have information about the actual post-merger integration activities 
within the merged firm and on potential changes in the merged entity’s technology 
strategy after the acquisition. Such detailed information could be helpful to explain 
parts of inventors’ post merger mobility and productivity. As it is doubtful that such 
information can be collected on a large scale it would be important to have some 
case study evidence on post-merger integration in firms. Case study evidence could 
also be helpful for getting more insights into the reasons behind inventor mobility 
after M&As. Are most of them leaving for a better job offer or is the decision rather 
made by the acquiring firm?  
For future research it would also be interesting to focus in addition on inventors that 
leave the acquiring firms and on those inventors that get hired after the acquisition. 
This would allow answering some more questions as, for example, whether inventors 
that left after an acquisition are replaced at all; and if so whether they are replaced 
by more productive colleagues or by inventors with a very different profile. This 
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could lead to interesting results about changes in technology activities as visible in 
changes in the profile of the inventive labor force after M&As. 
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Appendix 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics: Leaving versus Quitting Inventors.  
 Inventors  
Behavior after the acquisition stay  leave  quit patenting 
Number (#) of observations  449 95 129 
 
mean 
(std. deviation) 
mean 
(std. deviation) 
difference 
(std. error) 
Inventor characteristics:    
# pre-acquisition patents  
6.88 
(11.22) 
6.57 
(5.40) 
5.47 
(5.14) 
pre-acquisition patents of the inventor for the 
acquired firm over total patents (%) 
0.81 
(0.30) 
0.51 
(0.34) 
0.77 
(0.29) 
# post-acquisition patents 
4.16 
(5.38) 
2.89 
(3.55) 
0 
(0.00) 
citations received (yes/no) 
0.15 
(0.36) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
0.13 
(0.34) 
private patents (yes/no) 
0.07 
(0.26) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
0.12 
(0.32) 
experience  
8.79 
(6.69) 
10.91 
(6.06) 
9.20 
(6.23) 
pre-acquisition techn. diversity 
0.32 
(0.31) 
0.45 
(0.31) 
0.38 
(0.29) 
centrality (target) 
0.22 
(0.37) 
0.05 
(0.10) 
0.09 
(0.21) 
centrality (acquirer) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
time since last patenting 
0.65 
(1.21) 
1.11 
(1.48) 
1.54 
(0.52) 
Deal characteristics:    
acquired stake 
94.13 
(14.88) 
94.10 
(14.50) 
94.50 
(13.87) 
horizontal M&A (same 3-digit NACE) 
0.48 
(0.50) 
0.43 
(0.50) 
0.46 
(0.50) 
cross-border M&A 
0.44 
(0.50) 
0.49 
(0.50) 
0.64 
(0.49) 
Acquiring and target  firms’ characteristics:    
# patents of acquiring firm 
118.47 
(1,146.17) 
123.00 
(374.52) 
62.15 
(208.00) 
group of 2-4 inventors (yes/no) 
0.32 
(0.47) 
0.28 
(0.45) 
0.50 
(0.50) 
group of more than 4 inventors (yes/no) 
0.27 
(0.45) 
0.14 
(0.35) 
0.24 
(0.43) 
target in NACE 24-26 
0.14 
(0.35) 
0.13 
(0.33) 
0.05 
(0.23) 
target in NACE 29 
0.15 
(0.36) 
0.11 
(0.31) 
0.20 
(0.40) 
target in NACE 30-33 
0.19 
(0.40) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.09 
(0.29) 
German target 
0.37 
(0.48) 
0.26 
(0.44) 
0.31 
(0.46) 
French target 
0.17 
(0.37) 
0.13 
(0.33) 
0.17 
(0.38) 
UK target 
0.18 
(0.38) 
0.27 
(0.49) 
0.22 
(0.41) 
 
